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PRINCIPLES OF PRETRIAL RELEASE: 





Bail reform is happening. Across the country, jurisdictions are 
beginning to recognize that contemporary pretrial systems rooted in money 
bail are discriminatory, ineffective, and (by and large) unconstitutional.  A 
common and substantial component of contemporary reforms is an 
increased reliance on conditional release as an alternative to pretrial 
incarceration.  In many ways, conditional release represents an 
improvement over money bail, but the practice of conditional release has its 
own pitfalls. 
This Article identifies unforeseen and unplanned harms that can result 
from a system of conditional release and proposes five principles that 
jurisdictions can follow to eliminate or mitigate these harms.  As the 
options for pretrial conditions continue to expand, judges may impose more 
conditions than are necessary, including conditions that are burdensome 
and ineffective.  Because pretrial monitoring is inexpensive—especially 
when subsidized by user fees for pretrial monitoring—there is a risk that 
courts will impose monitoring and other conditions on people who would 
previously have been released without conditions.  Taken together, these 
harms can prolong people’s involvement in the criminal justice system, 
restrict their liberty in profound ways, set them up for pretrial 
incarceration through technical violations, and saddle them with 
unaffordable debts. 
To responsibly use conditional release without replicating the harms 
of money bail, jurisdictions should adopt the following five principles.  One, 
 
* Brook Hopkins is the Executive Director of the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard 
Law School. Chiraag Bains is the Director of Legal Strategies at Demos and a former 
Visiting Senior Fellow at the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School. Colin 
Doyle is a staff attorney at the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School. 
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release on recognizance should be the norm and conditional release the 
exception.  Two, the principle of parsimony should guide decisions over 
what conditions of release to impose—meaning that burdens placed on 
defendants and restrictions of their liberty should not exceed the legitimate 
interests of the government.  Three, conditions should be minimal, related 
to the charged conduct, and proportionate to the risk of flight and pretrial 
criminal activity.  Four, jurisdictions should not charge fees for conditional 
release, pretrial services, or pretrial monitoring.  Five, restrictions on 
pretrial liberty should be evidence-based. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In most jurisdictions in the United States, someone accused of a crime 
and awaiting trial is either released from jail or detained indefinitely 
because they cannot afford to pay money bail.  Those who can afford to 
post bail—however dangerous they are, however high their risk of flight—
get released.  Those who cannot afford to post bail—even if they pose no 
danger to the community and are a sure bet to return for court—remain 
detained.1  Under this pretrial system, it is better to be guilty, dangerous, 
and rich than to be innocent, harmless, and poor.  America’s discriminatory 
pretrial practices contribute to mass incarceration at great expense.  Pretrial 
detention costs the United States approximately $14 billion each year,2 and 
 
 1 See generally HARVARD LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, MOVING 
BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM (2016), available at http://cjpp.law.harvard
.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/E247-U6GM] [hereinafter 
CJPP BAIL REFORM PRIMER] (presenting findings that money bail has been shown to unfairly 
disadvantage people who cannot afford it). 
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the increase in pretrial detention over the last few decades accounts for all 
of the net jail growth in the United States during that time.3  On any given 
day, around half a million people are incarcerated having only been 
accused—not convicted—of a crime.4  Empirical research has also found 
that “[H]ispanic and black defendants are more likely to be detained 
[pretrial] than similarly situated white defendants.”5 
Justice system actors and Americans at large are coming to view the 
money bail system as unfair and unwise.6  To lower jail populations and 
provide equal treatment under the law, advocates are pushing a variety of 
reforms: procedural protections for preventive detention, cite-and-release 
standards, risk assessment tools, and the expansion of pretrial services, to 
name a few.  Jurisdictions are increasingly looking to pretrial monitoring as 
an alternative to pretrial incarceration.  As states and counties expand 
pretrial services, and as technologies such as GPS tracking and remote 
alcohol monitoring become more common, many courts now have a 
broader range of pretrial conditions at their disposal than the familiar 
options of detention, release on recognizance, or release on money bail. 
On ethical, constitutional, and policy grounds, a system of conditional 
release is better than a system of jailing people on unaffordable bail without 
due process of law.  But the expansion of pretrial release conditions carries 
its own pitfalls.  One danger is that courts will impose conditions not only 
upon people whom the court would otherwise have detained, but also upon 
people whom the court would have otherwise released on recognizance.  
Another danger is that courts will underuse simple, effective conditions like 
phone call reminders for court dates, while overusing burdensome 
conditions such as drug testing, drug monitoring, in-person reporting, and 
 
 3 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarceration: The 
Whole Pie 2018, at 6 (2018), available at https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html 
[https://perma.cc/56LY-SNZG]. 
 4 Id. at 2. 
 5 Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in 
the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 222, 222 (2004). 
 6 See, e.g., Editorial Board, Fixing the Unfair Bail System is Worth the Costs, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fixing-the-unfair-bail-
system-is-worth-the-costs/2017/09/09/ff3c5c4c-73eb-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html?
utm_term=.a158e99985d7 [https://perma.cc/CLH6-ZRKW]; Editorial Board, Cash Bail’s 
Lonely Defender, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/opi
nion/cash-bails-lonely-defender.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6DE3-P4AU]; Times Editorial 
Board, How the Poor Get Locked Up and the Rich Go Free, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-bail-reform-20170816-story,amp.html 
[https://perma.cc/XSK6-7RKJ]. 
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GPS bracelets.7  Jurisdictions may also seek to pass on the costs of pretrial 
monitoring to defendants by imposing fees to pay for drug testing, alcohol 
monitoring, and geolocation tracking.  The overuse of conditions of release 
and the charging of fees can restrict people’s liberty, prolong their 
involvement with the criminal justice system, and lead to technical 
violations of pretrial release, which in turn can result in revocation of 
release and imposition of jail time.  In short, unnecessary release conditions 
and fees can set people up to fail and can replicate some of the harms of 
money bail. 
This Article suggests a framework of five principles that jurisdictions 
should adopt to fairly and responsibly administer pretrial conditional 
release.  First, consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “liberty 
is the norm” pretrial,8 judges should maximize the use of release on one’s 
own recognizance, imposing conditions only when truly necessary to 
prevent or deter flight and criminal activity.  Second, the decision of what 
release conditions to impose should be governed by the principle of 
parsimony, which holds that punishment and deprivation of liberty should 
not exceed the legitimate interest of the state.  Third, conditions should be 
the least restrictive possible, related to the charged conduct, and 
proportionate to the risk of flight and pretrial criminal activity.  Conditions 
of release should be aimed at supporting, rather than supervising, the 
accused.  Very few defendants willfully abscond pretrial; more often, they 
fail to appear because they lose track of their court date, lack transportation, 
or have competing work, family, and childcare obligations.9  Pretrial 
services should be centered on positive interventions—such as phone or 
text reminders of court dates and transportation to court—rather than 
punitive deterrents—such as unnecessary drug testing and revocation.  
Fourth, jurisdictions should avoid charging fees for pretrial services, as 
these can create untenable pressure on poor defendants and their families, 
result in unnecessary incarceration when they are unable to pay, and 
exacerbate wealth and racial disparities.  Pretrial justice is a public good 
that should be funded collectively by taxpayers. Fifth, dovetailing with the 
 
 7 See generally CHICAGO CMTY. BOND FUND, PUNISHMENT IS NOT A “SERVICE”: THE 
INJUSTICE OF PRETRIAL CONDITIONS IN COOK COUNTY (2017), available at https://chicago
bond.org/docs/pretrialreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRN8-HGZ7] (arguing that pretrial 
release conditions in Cook County have become increasingly punitive as more people are 
being diverted from jail). 
 8 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 9 See, e.g., CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL & RELEASE WORK GRP., FINAL CONSENSUS 
REPORT ON OPTIMAL PRETRIAL JUSTICE, at 2 (2016), available at https://www.sccgov.
org/sites/ceo/Documents/final-consensus-report-on-optimal-pretrial-justice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U7PQ-NE8Y]. 
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principle of parsimony, any restrictions on pretrial liberty should be 
evidence-based.  Too often, jurisdictions routinely impose conditions 
without studying whether those conditions actually improve pretrial 
outcomes.10 
I. PRINCIPLE 1: MAXIMIZE RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE 
In a functioning pretrial system that obeys the constitutional 
requirement that “liberty is the norm” pretrial,11 judges should maximize 
the use of release on one’s own recognizance.  The default rule should be to 
release pretrial defendants on recognizance.  As jurisdictions move away 
from money bail, they are likely to adopt risk assessment tools and 
additional forms of conditional release, including drug testing, electronic 
monitoring, mental health treatment, and more.  Conditional release should 
be understood as a restriction on pretrial liberty and should only be imposed 
when the prosecution has proved by clear and convincing evidence that it is 
necessary to prevent flight and secure public safety.  Risk assessment tools 
should be calibrated to recommend release on recognizance as the default 
pretrial outcome. 
Most jurisdictions have statutes or court rules that require judges to 
impose “the least restrictive condition[s]” determined to reasonably assure 
the defendant’s appearance at trial and public safety.12  This least restrictive 
condition is usually release on recognizance, which requires that someone 
accused of a crime promise to return to court and not commit a crime while 
on release.  That is enough of a condition for most people, as the evidence 
bears out.  In jurisdictions that have implemented reforms that result in 
releasing most people on recognizance, the overwhelming majority of those 
people have shown up for court dates and have not committed crimes on 
release.13  To impose conditions that restrict liberty beyond release on 
 
 10 Kristin Bechtel et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, 
Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 443, 461 (2017) (noting general lack of 
quantitative data regarding interventions from pretrial services). 
 11 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
 12 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:162-16. 
 13 For example, in Santa Clara County, which has taken steps to rely less on money bail 
and release more people pretrial, more than 95% of defendants reappear in court. See CTY. 
OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 46. Washington, D.C. 
releases 94% of defendants pretrial, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., RELEASE RATES 
FOR PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS WITHIN WASHINGTON, DC (2017), https://www.psa.g
ov/sites/default/files/2016%20Release%20Rates%20for%20DC%20Pretrial%20Defendants
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6STE-TNYQ], and 90% of them make their court dates, COURT 
SERVS. & OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR D.C., FY 2016 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 
27 (2016), available at https://www.csosa.gov/about/financial/afr/FY2016-CSOSA-AFR.pdf 
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recognizance, the government should have the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence that a restriction on liberty is necessary. 
Jurisdictions should calibrate pretrial processes to accelerate the 
release of people who are unlikely to flee or harm others.  Some 
jurisdictions have introduced procedures that allow such people to be 
released from jail on their recognizance without a hearing before a judge.14  
Commonly in these jurisdictions, a pretrial services agency has been 
granted the authority to identify people who are low-risk and to release 
them.15  Other jurisdictions have adopted policies that encourage the police 
to issue a summons rather than arrest someone who is likely to be released 
on recognizance.16 
As jurisdictions continue to expand pretrial services as an alternative 
to jailing people, more conditions of release will become available.  
Because many conditions of release are relatively inexpensive for the 
government, there is a risk that judges will impose conditions of release on 
people whom the judges previously would have released on personal 
recognizance.  On a per-defendant basis, operating pretrial services is much 
cheaper for local governments than operating jails, especially when 
jurisdictions require defendants to pay the cost of electronic monitoring or 
drug testing (a problematic arrangement, as we explain below with respect 
to Principle 4).  To use one example, it costs Los Angeles County less than 
$26 per day to monitor someone pretrial, but $177 per day to incarcerate 
that person.17  Thus, if the available budget for incarcerating and monitoring 
people pretrial were to remain constant, Los Angeles County could afford 
to monitor up to seven times as many people as the county could afford to 
incarcerate. 
Release on recognizance should remain the default pretrial disposition, 
even as more release options become available and even if monitoring more 
 
[https://perma.cc/MJK6-4R4V]. Data from 2012 through 2016 show that each year between 
88% and 90% of people released while awaiting trial remained arrest-free. Id. Each year, 
between 98% and 99% of released defendants were not arrested for violent crimes. Id. 
 14 See, e.g., B. Scott West, The Next Step in Pretrial Release Is Here: The Administrative 
Release Program, THE ADVOCATE, at 1 (Jan. 2017), https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender
_Resources/The%20Advocate/Advocate%20Newsletter%20Jan%202017%20(COLOR%20-
%20FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/R2QF-MNU2] (discussing the Non-Financial Uniform 
Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program in Kentucky). 
 15 See id. 
 16 See, e.g., N.J. JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND 
LEGISLATURE 7–8 (2016), http://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2016cjrannual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WG7H-BFWC]. 
 17 SHEILA KUHL & HILDA SOLIS, MOTION BY SUPERVISORS SHEILA KUEHL AND HILDA 
SOLIS ON BAIL REFORM at 3 (Mar. 8, 2017), http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/
112060.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHC-VC3G]. 
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people is not burdensome for the government.  The Constitution requires 
liberty to be the norm pending trial.18  Conditional release should be 
understood as a restriction of this pretrial liberty.  Pretrial conditions—
especially when multiple conditions are imposed—can unnecessarily 
burden a defendant’s ability to work, care for children, and meet financial 
obligations.  Most pretrial interventions restrict a defendant’s freedom. 
Electronic monitoring and house arrest are the more obvious examples, but 
even less restrictive requirements such as weekly in-person check-ins with 
pretrial services can be difficult for people to meet given their other 
commitments and resource limitations.  Pretrial services are typically 
located within or adjacent to downtown courthouses, sometimes far from 
residential neighborhoods.19  After juggling a job, or multiple jobs, and 
caring for children and family, a bus trip and meeting every week can strain 
one’s time and finances.  These restrictions on liberty should be imposed 
only when necessary and when the restrictions have been proven to work. 
As explored in Principle Five ,many pretrial conditions are imposed without 
any idea of their effectiveness or any plans for measuring their worth. 
If pretrial service agencies use tools or assessments to develop release 
recommendations for judges, these tools should reflect a presumption of 
unconditional release.  Across the country, algorithmic risk assessment 
tools are becoming a more common feature of pretrial service agencies.20  
These tools often provide release recommendations to judges and pretrial 
staff, encouraging them to detain, release, or impose conditions on a 
particular person based on his or her level of risk as calculated by the tool.21  
These recommendations should reflect the presumption in favor of 
releasing defendants on their own recognizance.  Although risk assessment 
algorithms use historical data to predict someone’s likelihood of missing 
court dates or being arrested pretrial, these predictions by themselves do not 
(and cannot) determine whether someone should be released, released 
conditionally, or detained.  Release decisions can be informed by 
 
 18 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
 19 For example, Washington D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency is located near a 
courthouse on the National Mall. Location Directory, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., 
https://www.psa.gov/?q=contact/location_directory [https://perma.cc/R3K2-NKZF]. 




 21 See, e.g., GLENN A. GRANT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 
AND THE LEGISLATURE FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2017 11–13, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts
/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H6L-DSVT] (describing Decision 
Making Framework (DMF) in New Jersey). 
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quantitative data, but the decision to release or detain someone is a values-
based decision.  In jurisdictions with risk assessment tools, these values-
based decisions are made by policymakers who calibrate how the risk 
assessment tools translate risk levels into release recommendations.  If risk 
assessment tools are calibrated to tolerate only a low-level of risk, then 
pretrial services will end up recommending pretrial incarceration or onerous 
conditions of release for nearly all defendants.  Instead, policymakers 
should calibrate these tools such that they recommend release on 
recognizance for the overwhelming majority of defendants. 
II. PRINCIPLE 2: FOLLOW THE PRINCIPLE OF PARSIMONY 
A useful starting point for thinking about the appropriate level of 
supervision is the principle of parsimony.  Parsimony is the idea that 
penalties should be no more severe than necessary to serve the state’s 
legitimate interests.22  In the sentencing context, the state’s legitimate 
interests are retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.23 
Sanctions that exceed these purposes are gratuitous. 
The parsimony principle emerges from a recognition that punishment 
involves harm, whether by the restraint on a person’s liberty or the 
infliction of pain.  The utilitarian Jeremy Bentham saw punishment as 
“itself evil,” and therefore defensible only “in as far as it promises to 
exclude some greater evil.”24  Enlightenment philosopher and criminologist 
Cesare Beccaria insisted that punishment be “the minimum possible in the 
given circumstances,”25 and William Blackstone likewise argued that “[t]he 
method however of inflicting punishment ought always to be proportioned 
to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means exceed it.”26 
The value of parsimony is reflected throughout the law of American 
punishment.  Law professor Norval Morris articulated parsimony as a 
“utilitarian and humanitarian” constraint on sentencing, and those limits on 
punishment can be observed at work in state sentencing guidelines.27  In the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress codified the parsimony principle 
in the requirement that federal courts “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
 
 22 Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 
363, 364 (1997). 
 23 Id.; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010). 
 24 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 23 (1830). 
 25 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 113 (Richard 
Bellamy ed., 1995). 
 26 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 13 (1769). 
 27 Frase, supra note 22, at 373–74 (1997) (quoting NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 61 (1974) and discussing Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines). 
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greater than necessary,” to serve the purposes of punishment.28  The same 
doctrine underlies the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
under which disproportionate penalties, such as the death penalty for non-
homicide crimes against persons29 and life without parole for non-
homicides crimes committed by juveniles,30 have been deemed cruel and 
unusual.  It is not surprising, then, that the seminal National Academies 
report, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States, identified 
parsimony as one of the core principles “that should inform the use of 
incarceration and the role of prison in U.S. society.”31 
There is no reason parsimony should be limited to the context of 
punishment.  Indeed, scholars have applied it to regulatory sanctions—
sanctions imposed for legitimate state purposes other than punishment32—
such as preventive detention.33  The application of parsimony to the pretrial 
context is straightforward.  Restrictions on an accused individual’s liberty, 
whether by detention or release conditions, constitute harms that must be 
limited to that which is necessary to serve the legitimate pretrial goals of 
those restrictions: appearance in court and the safety of the community.34  
 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 29 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 437 (2008) (death penalty “not a 
proportional punishment” for rape of child and “should not be expanded to instances where 
the victim’s life was not taken”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1977) (death penalty 
is “grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment” for rape of adult). 
 30 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (noting that “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate 
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense” and concluding that 
“[w]ith respect to life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals 
of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate . . . provides an adequate 
justification”). 
 31 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 323 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve 
Redburn eds., 2014), available at https://doi.org/10.17226/18613 [https://perma.cc/WNL3-
63T5] (“Punishments for crime, and especially lengths of prison sentences, should never be 
more severe than is necessary to achieve the retributive or preventive purposes for which 
they are imposed.”). 
 32 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (distinguishing punitive 
from regulatory sanctions). The Supreme Court has described pretrial detention under the 
Bail Reform Act aimed at “preventing danger to the community” to be regulatory in nature. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. 
 33 See generally Carol Steiker, Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice: 
Promises and Pitfalls, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 194 (Andrew 
Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (discussing proportionality as a constraint on the use of 
preventive detention). 
 34 NAT’L INST. OF CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF 
AN EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL SYSTEM AND AGENCY 44 (2017), available at https://nicic.gov/
framework-pretrial-justice-essential-elements-effective-pretrial-system-and-agency [https://p
erma.cc/7TAE-LZDX]. 
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The federal Bail Reform Act explicitly required that judges release 
individuals “subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination 
of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person 
and the community.”35  Many state statutes include similar language,36 as 
does the American Bar Association’s standards for pretrial release.37 
However, in practice, across the country onerous pretrial conditions 
are imposed on defendants without sufficient regard to their individual 
circumstances or whether such conditions will actually serve the 
government’s legitimate pretrial goals.  Many courts require in-person 
meetings with pretrial services officers, which are often time consuming 
and inconvenient, even though “no good evidence” exists to show that these 
meetings make a difference to appearance or rearrest rates.38  The District 
of Columbia, which has virtually eliminated the use of money bail, 
routinely requires drug testing of defendants despite repeated research 
findings that drug testing does not reduce pretrial failure.39  Increasingly, 
jurisdictions are also turning to electronic monitoring to surveil released 
defendants.40  Such monitoring is expensive, can interfere with personal 
relationships and employment opportunities, and tends to make individuals 
feel “unfairly stigmatized.”41  And yet studies do not show that monitoring 
 
 35 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 36 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1344, 1395 n.229 (2014) (collecting state statutes). 
 37 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-5.2 (3d ed. 2007) 
(“[T]he court should impose the least restrictive of release conditions necessary reasonably 
to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court, protect the safety of the community or any 
person, and to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.”). 
 38 Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial 
Detention and Release, 3 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 42 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://academ
yforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PD4W-UK94] (discussing studies). 
 39 MARIE VANNOSTRAND ET AL., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION 20–24 (2011), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/bail%
20pretrial%20release/sciencepretrial.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8JL-UMAW] (reviewing 
studies from the 1980s and 1990s in the District of Columbia, Arizona, Maryland, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin, and summarizing that none of them “found empirical evidence that could be 
used to demonstrate that when drug testing is applied to defendants as a condition of pretrial 
release it is effective at deterring or reducing pretrial failure, even when a system of 
sanctions is imposed”). 
 40 See CJPP BAIL PRIMER, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that the use of electronic 
monitoring increased 32% between 2000 and 2014). 
 41 Id. (citing NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM 2 
(2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234460.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMR5-TTDF]). 
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makes court appearance more likely or rearrest less likely.42 In addition to 
raising Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and due process 
concerns,43 these intrusive conditions run afoul of the parsimony principle 
because they do not appear to serve the state’s legitimate pretrial interests. 
To be parsimonious, release conditions should be carefully targeted to 
serve legitimate pretrial interests.  Where less restrictive measures are 
available and effective, they should be used.  For example, at least for 
defendants accused of public-order and otherwise low-level offenses, 
clearer summons forms and court date reminders by text message can be an 
effective way of ensuring appearance.44  Many people miss court dates not 
because they are scofflaws, but because they do not understand their 
summons, they forget about their court date, or they did not arrange for 
leave from work or childcare in advance.45  For these defendants, the 
imposition of more severe restraints on liberty would be unnecessary and, 
being un-parsimonious, would constitute an abuse of government authority. 
The use of unnecessary conditions can also have unforeseen harmful 
consequences.  Research indicates that over-supervision can make pretrial 
failure more likely.  For example, one study found that “lower-risk 
defendants who were required to participate” in drug testing and treatment 
“had higher failure rates than their lower-risk counterparts who were not.”46  
In addition, undue restrictions could cause the public to lose faith in the 
legal system.  If people do not view the courts as fair, they may become less 
 
 42 See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND ET AL., supra note 39, at 24–27. 
 43 See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871–72 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
suspicionless drug testing of pretrial supervisees constituted an unreasonable search where 
the government failed to make either an individualized showing related to the defendant or 
empirical support for a pattern of drug use leading to nonappearance); United States v. 
Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 363 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that mandatory imposition of 
curfew and electronic monitoring conditions on defendants accused of sex offenses violates 
Due Process and Excessive Bail clauses); United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 
395 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (same). But see United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1041 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that such conditions do not facially violate the Due Process Clause). 
 44 See, e.g., BRICE COOKE ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE OUTCOMES 4 (Jan. 2018) (finding that redesigning New York City’s summons form 
to make the most important information stand out reduced failure to appear by 13% and text 
message reminders reduced failure to appear by 26%), https://www.courthousenews.com
/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/crim-just-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFF9-VJFY]. 
 45 Id. at 6. 
 46 Kristin Bechtel et al., supra note 10, at 449 (citing Marie VanNostrand & Gena 
Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, 73 FED. ARBITRATION 3, 5-6 
(2009)). See also COMMISSION TO REFORM MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 14 
(2014) (“over-supervision of low risk defendants produces poorer outcomes and wastes 
resources”), http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commission-final-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X94K-UZLX]. 
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likely to rely on the judicial system to seek redress or even less likely to 
obey the law.47 
Another benefit of the parsimony principle is that it can help prevent 
pretrial services from becoming an arbitrary system of social control.  
Through conditions of release, the government has the power to regulate a 
person’s physical movement (travel restrictions and curfews), bodily 
consumption (prohibitions on drug and alcohol use), and employment 
activity (requirements to seek or maintain a job).48  But just because the 
government can do these things, does not mean it should.  Unless tailored to 
an assessment of an individual’s risk of flight or danger to the community, 
such restrictions look like government acting opportunistically to 
manipulate the behavior of those who have come within the ambit of the 
justice system, in service of the government’s general social policy goals.  
Meanwhile, people not charged with crimes will be free to make their own 
choices in these matters.  Without parsimony, restrictions on pretrial liberty 
will be arbitrary on some level. 
Where police activity is concentrated in communities of color or the 
criminal law is enforced disproportionately against racial minorities, the 
harms of over-supervision are even greater.  Racial disparities in the justice 
system mean that pretrial supervision, if unnecessarily restrictive, may 
replicate elements of previous forms of racial subordination.49  This has an 
effect at the community level.  Many communities of color are subject to 
greater state involvement and reduced liberty because policing and 
 
 47 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 25 (1968) (arguing that sentencing disproportionate to the offense creates “a risk of 
either confusing morality or flouting it and bringing the law to contempt”); Tom R. Tyler & 
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating 
Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 86 (2014) 
(“People who viewed legal authorities as more legitimate were more likely to report crime 
and criminals . . . . They were also more likely to be willing to cooperate with the legal 
system in prosecuting criminals . . . .”); Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts 
Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or 
Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095, 1104–05 (2014) (“Studies indicate 
that people are both more likely to obey law and to accept decisions when they view the 
courts as legitimate. This includes ordinary citizens following the laws and accepting 
decisions related to rule breaking, disputes and misdemeanors, and criminals involved in 
felony behaviors.”). 
 48 See CJPP BAIL PRIMER, supra note 1, at 5–6 (2016) (explaining how conditions of 
release allow the government to control different aspects of an individual’s life). 
 49 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the modern criminal justice system has 
replicated the harms of the era of Jim Crow segregation). 
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prosecution have been concentrated there.  Constraining pretrial conditions 
with parsimony would prevent this effect from being even more severe. 
III. PRINCIPLE 3: SUPPORT RATHER THAN SUPERVISE 
Pretrial services agencies are tasked with helping defendants make 
their court appearances and promoting public safety.50  A pretrial services 
agency that focuses solely on monitoring defendants and reporting them for 
failure to comply with their conditions of release will not be the most 
effective at accomplishing these goals.  Instead, a pretrial services agency 
should use its various tools and interventions in a way that supports 
defendants. 
One challenge to maintaining a supportive, rather than supervisory, 
approach is that around 40% of pretrial services agencies are located within 
probation departments, which have a different mission.51  Whereas pretrial 
services agencies work with individuals who are presumptively innocent, 
probation departments work with adjudicated individuals who have fewer 
rights and protections.52  And while pretrial services agencies have a limited 
mission of assuring court appearance and protecting public safety, 
probation departments engage in criminal sanction and offender 
rehabilitation.53  To avoid conflating the different functions, it is crucial for 
pretrial services agencies to maintain their independence, even if they work 
under the umbrella of a probation department.54  The best practice is to 
house pretrial services separately from probation. 
Pretrial services agencies should avoid resorting to probationary 
tactics because they risk setting defendants up for failure.  In the probation 
context, supervision has been shown to increase recidivism among 
individuals who have an otherwise low risk of reoffending.55  This is in 
large part because “the sheer number of [probation] requirements imposes a 
nearly impossible burden on many offenders.”56  A similar consequence can 
result in the pretrial context.  When a defendant violates a condition of 
 
 50 See Nat’l Inst. of Corr., A Framework for Pretrial Justice: Essential Elements of an 
Effective Pretrial System and Agency 44 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/
Library/032831.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3FS-BTAX]. 
 51 See id. at 33. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Vincent Schiraldi, The Pennsylvania Community Corrections Story, COLUM. U. JUST. 
LAB 6 (Apr. 25, 2018), http://justicelab.iserp.columbia.edu/img/PACommunityCorrections
4.19.18finalv3.pdf. [https://perma.cc/4DEH-LZ2J]. 
 56 Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1035 (2013). 
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release, he or she may be subject to rearrest, detention, and prosecution for 
contempt of court—even though, in most cases, the conduct would be legal 
absent the release condition.57  To avoid triggering these consequences, 
pretrial services agencies should attempt to handle violations of conditions 
of release administratively and invoke revocation proceedings only when 
the conduct actually interfered with the court’s function or presented a risk 
to public safety.58 
One simple service that effectively increases court appearance without 
overburdening defendants is automated phone-call reminders about 
upcoming court dates.  While automated or manual phone-call reminders 
are common in other industries that seek to promote appearance rates—like 
doctors’ and dentists’ offices—these reminders are only beginning to take 
hold in our courts, despite being a proven, helpful tool.  As a pioneer in 
adopting phone-call reminders, Multnomah County, Oregon (which 
includes Portland) ran a pilot program nearly a decade ago that placed 
automatic calls to pretrial defendants to alert them of upcoming court 
dates.59  The program lowered failure-to-appear rates by 37% percent and 
saved the county over one million dollars in the first eight months, leading 
Multnomah county to expand the program countywide.60  In 2017, a pilot 
program in New York City found that text message reminders alone 
improved appearance rates by 26% percent.61   Two empirical studies have 
each found that court reminders increase appearance rates.62  These 
reminders can be a simple, cost-effective intervention to improve 
appearance rates without disrupting peoples’ lives. 
The success of these court reminder programs belies the notion that 
missed court dates are primarily the result of defendants’ flight from justice 
or willful disobedience of the courts.  Rather, a working group on pretrial 
reform from Santa Clara County, California found “many of those who 
miss a court appearance do so for mundane reasons such as lack of reliable 
transportation, illness, or inability to leave work or find childcare, rather 
 
 57 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1329(d-1)(1) (2016). 
 58 See STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE § 4.3, commentary (NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL 
SERVS. AGENCIES 2004), available at https://perma.cc/TP6H-F98Q. 
 59 MATT O’KEEFE, COURT APPEARANCE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: 2007 ANALYSIS 
HIGHLIGHTS 1–2 (2007), available at https://multco.us/file/26891/download [https://perma.
cc/PAH8-RUTL]. 
 60 Id. 
 61 BRICE COOK ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
OUTCOMES, UNIV. OF CHICAGO CRIME LAB & IDEAS 42, 4 (2018), https://www.courthouse
news.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/crim-just-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2RJ-L6AM]. 
 62 Kristin Bechtel et al., supra note 10, at 460. 
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than out of a desire to escape justice.”63  Because defendants miss court for 
mundane reasons, mundane solutions might be the answer.  Phone call 
reminders, access to public transportation, or public childcare in the 
courtroom are not only more humane than arrest warrants and jail time—
they are also likely to be more effective. 
Community engagement and support is another untapped resource for 
pretrial service agencies.  Santa Clara County is in the process of 
implementing a new pretrial program called Community Release.64  In this 
program, defendants are released pretrial and choose a non-profit partner 
organization in the community, such as a church or community group.65  
This organization in turn promises to help support the person on release 
through methods such as providing transportation to court, reminding the 
person of upcoming court dates, and helping the person find a job or get the 
treatment and services they need.66  Time will tell how the program fares, 
but it could lead to greater community engagement with the criminal justice 
system, improved pretrial outcomes, and improved community life and 
public safety. 
IV. PRINCIPLE 4: DON’T CHARGE FEES 
The criminal justice system is a public good.  Like highways, public 
schools, and sanitation departments, its benefits redound to the entire 
community and therefore the entire community should pay for it.  All 
aspects of the criminal justice system—police, prosecutors, public 
defenders, judges, courts, pretrial services, probation, prisons and jails—
should be collectively funded through tax dollars.  In many jurisdictions, 
however, criminal justice “user fees” charged to defendants, inmates and 
probationers have increased in number and size.67  These “user fees” are 
common in the pretrial context. 
 
 63 CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 2, 
http://sccgov.iqm2.com/Citizens/FileOpen.aspx?Type=4&ID=153959&MeetingID=7200. 
 64 Silicon Valley De-Bug Leads the Charge on Criminal Justice Reform, ROSENBERG 
FOUND.: NEWS (Feb. 17, 2018), https://rosenbergfound.org/silicon-valley-de-bug-leads-the-
charge-on-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/95NK-ZU7B]; CTY. OF SANTA CLARA 
BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 63–64. 
 65 CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 64. 
 66 Silicon Valley De-Bug Leads the Charge on Criminal Justice Reform, ROSENBERG 
FOUND.: NEWS (Feb. 17, 2018), https://rosenbergfound.org/silicon-valley-de-bug-leads-the-
charge-on-criminal-justice-reform/; see also CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE 
WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 63. 
 67 See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A 
BARRIER TO REENTRY 7 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees
%20and20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9HJ-FNJE]. 
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For example, judges in some jurisdictions condition pretrial release on 
the defendant’s submission to regular drug testing.68  Defendants in many 
jurisdictions are charged fees between $15 and $20 per test.69  Some 
jurisdictions charge defendants a fee for pretrial supervision.70  For 
example, in Indiana, a defendant may be charged an initial pretrial service 
fee of $100, a monthly fee of $30, and an additional administrative fee of 
$100.71  Almost every state72 charges defendants fees for electronic 
monitoring, which can run as high as $900 per month.73 
Some states permit or even require judges to consider a defendant’s 
financial circumstances when setting conditions of release and to waive or 
reduce fees for indigent defendants.74  But those provisions are rare.75  If an 
individual fails to pay fees associated with pretrial conditions of release, 
that individual may be subject to rearrest and detention for violating her 
conditions of release. 76  Thus, just as with the money bail system, 
 
 68 See, e.g., COURT SERVS. AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR D.C., FY 2016 
AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 20 (2016). 
 69 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, https://www.tarrant
county.com/en/pretrial-services/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/ZR5Q-7MYE] ($16 fee for each pretrial drug test); Pretrial Reform in 
Kentucky, Admin. Office of the Courts, Kentucky Court of Justice at 6 (Jan. 2013) (source 
on file with author) (Kentucky imposes “costly” fees on defendants for pretrial drug testing); 
Santa Clara County Office of Pretrial Services, Instructions for Random Drug Testing, 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/pretrial/Services/Forms/Documents/Female%20Drug%20Test
%20Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LL8-NAZG] ($15 fee for drug testing). 
 70 E.g. Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.3 (2018). See also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.01.160(2) 
(2018) (defendant may be charged supervision fees); Fla. Stat. § 948.09 (2018) (imposing 
fees for pretrial supervision). But see Court Guidelines, MASS.GOV (Nov, 2016), 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/trial-court/pre-trial-release-guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N85S-V5JT] (Massachusetts does not charge fees for supervision as a 
condition of pretrial release). 
 71 Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.3. 
 72 State-By-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/31
2455680/state-by-state-court-fees [https://perma.cc/S5G3-K8B4]. 
 73 Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You 
Get Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.ibtimes.
com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-jail-2065283 
[https://perma.cc/2XCP-MUJN]; Sukey Lewis, Electronic Monitoring of Defendants is 
Increasing, But at What Price?¸ KQED NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/
2017/08/02/electronic-monitoring-of-defendants-is-increasing-but-at-what-price/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z4KJ-R6KF]. 
 74 See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 62-11C-7(a) (requiring judge to consider a defendant’s 
ability to pay before setting a pretrial supervision fee). 
 75 See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCH., STATE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT REFORM BUILDER, https://cjdebtreform.org/ [https://perma.
cc/QBN4-Q28L]. 
 76 Markowitz, supra note 73; see also, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1329. 
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conditions of pretrial release can render an individual’s pretrial liberty 
contingent on her financial circumstances. 
The Supreme Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine 
absent a showing that the failure was willful: “If the probationer could not 
pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the 
court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment.” 77  The Court acknowledged the government’s 
“fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons,” but concluded 
that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to imprison a probationer who 
failed to pay a fine “through no fault of his own” and despite “all 
reasonable efforts.”78  This reasoning applies with even greater force in the 
pretrial context when the defendant’s liberty interest is stronger because she 
has not yet been convicted of a crime and when the government’s 
countervailing interest in punishment is therefore absent.79 
Fee-based conditions of confinement may also induce defendants to 
plead guilty to avoid continued financial obligations.  Researchers have 
observed this phenomenon in the bail context, where defendants agree to 
plead guilty for time served to get out of jail80—one study found that 
misdemeanor defendants who are detained pretrial are 25% more likely 
than similarly situated released defendants to plead guilty.81  Releasees who 
owe fees for pretrial services may feel inclined to plead guilty in order to 
stop the charges from accumulating.82  In some cases it may be cheaper and 
therefore preferable to be on probation after having pled guilty than on 
electronic monitoring.83  Although this phenomenon has been noted 
anecdotally in the press,84 more rigorous study is needed to fully understand 
the scope and magnitude of the problem. 
 
 77 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). 
 78 Id. at 668–69. 
 79 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
 80 Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial 
Detention 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 714–15 (2017). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Lewis, supra note 73; Derek Gilna, Electronic Monitoring Becomes More 
Widespread, but Problems Persist, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.prison
legalnews.org/news/2017/oct/9/electronic-monitoring-becomes-more-widespread-problems-
persist/[https://perma.cc/MWR8-UA4S] 
 83 Markowitz, supra note 73. 
 84 Eric Markowitz, Electronic Monitoring Has Become the New Debtors Prison, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/04/electronic-monitoring-
has-become-new-debtors-prison-397225.html [https://perma.cc/Q93J-RHNM]; Gilna, supra 
note 82. 
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The practice of charging defendants to fulfill the conditions of their 
release may be distorting sound policy decision-making.  By externalizing 
the expense of pretrial services onto defendants, system actors do not have 
to find money in their budget to impose burdensome pretrial conditions.  
Private companies that contract with jurisdictions to provide services such 
as electronic monitoring boast that their services come at no cost to the 
jurisdiction.85  Because pretrial programs are funded through user fees 
rather than local budgets, policymakers are never forced to weigh the 
expense of pretrial conditions against the public safety benefits they 
provide, or to create policies that narrowly tailor the imposition of the most 
expensive and burdensome conditions.  They have neither the incentive to 
evaluate the effectiveness of those services nor a fiscal reason to constrain 
their application. In some cases, governments may actually profit from 
charging fees for pretrial services.86  This creates an impermissible conflict 
of interest and a perverse incentive to maximize both the number of 
defendants who receive fee-based conditions and the number of fee-based 
conditions a defendant receives. 
It is not just governments that profit from pretrial services: across the 
country, jurisdictions contract with for-profit companies to provide 
electronic monitoring, drug testing, and other services.  These companies 
make their money from charging fees to pretrial defendants, indeed many of 
them have defendant payment portals on their websites.87  Private vendors 
have an incentive to expand the use of their services as broadly as 
possible,88 and they have lobbying arms that protect and expand their 
 
 85 See, e.g., OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICES, About Us, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 
SERVICES, http://offender-management.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/P8EW-QMH6] (last 
visited Jul. 30, 2018). 
 86 Markowitz, supra note 84. 
 87 See, e.g., OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICES, About Us, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 
SERVICES, http://offender-management.com/payments/ [https://perma.cc/PQW5-TTSL] (last 
visited Jul. 30, 2018); SCRAM NORTH CAROLINA, http://www.scramnorthcarolina.com/gov-
pay-net [https://perma.cc/E6WQ-XC55] (last visited Jul. 30, 2018). The website of a 
prominent vendor of alcohol monitoring technology, Scram Systems, explains in its profile 
of one jurisdiction that the county charges user fees that must be paid in advance in cash to 
cover daily monitoring costs. “Offenders are required to pay 1 to 2 weeks in advance, in 
cash, and are not allowed to fall behind in their payments. Nonpayment is considered a 
violation of the offender’s release and managed accordingly.” SCRAM SYSTEMS, Case 
Studies: Burleigh County Sheriff Uses Continuous Monitoring for an Effect 24/7 Sobriety 
Program, SCRAM SYSTEMS, https://www.scramsystems.com/case-studies/burleigh-county-
sheriff-uses-continuous-alcohol-monitoring-for-an-effective/ [https://perma.cc/BV8S-U8VS] 
(last visited Jul. 30, 2018). 
 88 See Avalana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 124 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 174 (2017). 
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business model.89  The rising political influence of private pretrial services 
vendors calls to mind the powerful influence that bail bond industry 
lobbyists have on policymaking, which implicates money bail.90  Indeed, as 
bail reform gains momentum, bail bond companies recognize that their 
business model may be short-lived, and some are turning to pretrial services 
as an alternative.91  Eliminating fees for pretrial services would remove 
some of the profit motive and could help mitigate the distortion in 
policymaking that it brings. 
V. PRINCIPLE 5: CONDITIONS OF RELEASE AND RESTRICTIONS ON 
LIBERTY SHOULD BE EVIDENCE BASED 
Policy reform should always be informed by data and research. This is 
especially true in the pretrial context, where public safety and the liberty of 
presumptively innocent individuals are at stake.  Troublingly, many 
conditions of release and forms of pretrial supervision currently in use have 
not been proven to be effective, or, in some cases, subject to 
methodologically sound study.92  Policymakers should closely consider the 
research, or lack thereof, before implementing pretrial release conditions.  
And courts and pretrial services agencies should implement robust data 
collection protocols that will enable them to internally track the success of 
certain release conditions and that will enable independent researchers to 
analyze their effectiveness. 
Pretrial drug testing has not been shown to increase appearance rates 
or decrease pretrial arrest.93  Randomized control trials have shown that 
 
 89 Eric Markowitz, Electronic Monitoring Has Become the New Debtors Prison, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/04/electronic-monitoring-
has-become-new-debtors-prison-397225.html  [https://perma.cc/UJ9H-JNUB]. 
 90 Gillian B. White, Who Really Makes Money Off Bail Bonds?, THE ATLANTIC (May 12, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/bail-bonds/526542/ [https://pe
rma.cc/RSW5-H7PR]. 
 91 Dave Flessner, Tennessee Recovery and Monitoring Offers Jail Alternative, TIMES 
FREE PRESS (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/
story/2017/sep/24/jail-alternativecompany-monitors-pre-trial-or/450332/ 
[https://perma.cc/52ZK-2KPR]; Renee K. Gadoua, Tennessee County Uses CPS Technology, 
But Skepticism Surrounds Effectiveness, BIG MOUNTAIN DATA (Aug. 18, 2015), 
http://www.bigmountaindata.com/tennessee-county-uses-gps-technology-but-skepticism-
surrounds-effectiveness/  https://perma.cc/JZ3F-85CP]. 
 92 Kristin Bechtel, et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, 
Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. CRIM. JUST. 443, 448–50, 460–61 (2017). 
 93 See MARIE VANNOSTRAND, KENNETH R. ROSE & KIMBERLY WEIBRECHT, STATE OF 
THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION 20–24 (2011). 
698 HOPKINS, BAINS & DOYLE [Vol. 108 
pretrial drug testing made no difference in either metric.94  Indeed, one 
study actually found that for high risk defendants, drug testing made no 
difference in pretrial success rates, but for lower risk defendants, pretrial 
drug testing actually lowered pretrial success.95  Another study found drug 
testing to be effective in reducing reincarceration of people on probation,96 
but subsequent studies have not been able to replicate those findings.97  In 
any event, research in the probation context does not address one of the 
primary indicators of success in the pretrial context: improvement in 
defendant appearance rates. 
Pretrial supervision practices involving meetings with a pretrial officer 
vary widely across jurisdictions and there is a dearth of systematic research 
demonstrating the effectiveness of particular supervision models.98  Two 
small experimental studies showed that pretrial supervision had no effect on 
appearance or rearrest rates.99  Although one study found some 
improvement in pretrial appearance rates from pretrial supervision, that 
study covered multiple jurisdictions with different pretrial supervision 
practices and was correlational, which is much weaker than a randomized 
control trial.100  There are some strong studies of supervision in the 
 
 94 John S. Goldkamp & Peter R. Jones, Pretrial Drug-Testing Experiments in Milwaukee 
and Prince George’s County: The Context of Implementation, 29 J. RES. CRIME DELINQ. 430, 
457–59 (1992); Mary A. Toborg et al., Assessment of Pretrial Urine Testing in the District 
of Columbia 14 (1989), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/119968N
CJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4AU-D4ZD]. See also Stefan Kapsch & Louis Sweeny, 
Multnomah County DMDA Project: Evaluation Final Report (1990). 
 95 Marie VanNostrand & Gina Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, 
31Washington, Office of Federal Detention Trustee (2009). 
 96 Angela Hawken & Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift 
and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE 4 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229023.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SN5-XSS7]. 
 97 Pamela K. Lattimore et al., Outcome Findings from the HOPE Demonstration Field 
Experiment: Is Swift, Certain, and Fair an Effective Supervision Strategy?, 15 CRIM. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1103, 1104 (2016); Daniel J. O’Connell et al., Decide Your Time: A Randomized 
Trial of Drug Testing and Graduated Sanctions Program for Probationers, 15 CRIM. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1–73, 1086 (2016). 
 98 See Marie VanNostrand, Kenneth R. Rose & Kimberly Weibrecht, State of the 
Science of Pretrial Release Recommendations and Supervision, 32 (2011); Megan Stevenson 
& Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 42–44 
(2017). 
 99 James Austin, Barry Krisberg & Paul Litsky, The Effectiveness of Supervised Pretrial 
Release, 31 CRIME AND DELINQ. 519, 523–35 (1985); John S. Goldkamp & Michael D. 
White, Restoring Accountability in Pretrial Release: The Philadelphia Pretrial Release 
Supervision Experiments, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 143, 154 (2006). 
 100 CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & MARIE VANNOSTRAND, EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF 
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probation and parole context that show that required meetings have no 
effect on new criminal activity, but do tend to increase technical 
violations.101 
There is a lack of sound research about the effectiveness of electronic 
monitoring in the pretrial context.102  The research that does exist has not 
found that electronic monitoring improves pretrial outcomes.103  One 
jurisdiction found that defendants released pretrial with electronic 
monitoring had similar failure to appear and new arrest rates as those 
released without electronic monitoring, and those on electronic monitoring 
actually experienced more technical violations than those without electronic 
monitoring.104  One problem with the existing research is that there have 
been no randomized control trials.  Moreover, observational research 
suffers from the problem that individuals who are put on electronic 
monitoring are usually considered higher risk than those individuals who 
are released without electronic monitoring.105 
Notably, text message court reminders are the one pretrial intervention 
with a proven track record of success.106 One study found through a 
randomized control trial that text message court reminders reduced failure 
to appear rates by 26%.107 Hypothesizing that people did not make a 
deliberate decision to miss court dates, researchers decided to test a 
behavioral intervention (text message reminders) rather than an 
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enforcement intervention (increasing the penalty for failing to appear).108 
The results of the study confirmed that simply reminding people of their 
court date can lead to significantly higher appearance rates.109 
Courts and policymakers should prioritize conditions of release that 
have been proven effective through rigorous study. But they should also 
take steps to understand the effectiveness of their own policies. 
Jurisdictions should adopt thorough data collection practices that allow 
them to track and analyze case outcomes in which various conditions of 
release are imposed. They should also make this data available to 
independent researchers to improve our collective understanding of the 
effectiveness of release conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
The current momentum behind money bail reform holds much promise 
for a more just and effective pretrial system. But there is a risk that 
imposing excessive conditions of release will reproduce some of the harms 
of money bail. The five principles of pretrial release outlined above offer a 
roadmap to lasting pretrial reform that avoids replicating some of the 
injustices of money bail. 
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